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JURISDICTION
The final order of the district court was entered on June 23, 2004. The notice of
appeal was filed on July 7, 2004. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this
Court on August 5, 2004. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)G) (2002).

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Bilanzich frames only one issue on appeal, then raises two issues. Correctly
framed, those issues are as follows:
I.
Whether attorney fees may be awarded under a guaranty in which the guarantor
has guaranteed payment of attorney fees incurred with regard to the underlying obligation
but there is no language in the guaranty itself regarding attorney fees incurred in litigation
concerning the guaranty.
Standard of Review. Whether attorney fees are recoverable under a contract is a
question of law reviewed for correctness. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11,
TJ16,40P.3dlll9
Preservation. This issue was presented below and is preserved in the Record at
R. 2432-2433, 2488-2489.
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n.
Whether a party who has successfully avoided his obligations under a contract by
having it nullified can thereafter rely on that contract to obtain an award of attorney fees.
Standard of Review. Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. See R.T. Nielson, 2002 UT 11 at l[fl6.
Preservation. This issue was presented below and is preserved in the Record at
R. 2520-2536.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2002), which states:
Reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees. A court may award costs and
attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any
promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28,
1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other
writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This appeal challenges the trial court's denial of a motion for an award of attorney
fees arising out of the terms of a personal guaranty. The trial court had previously
entered a judgment declaring the guaranty unenforceable and nullifying the same. The
guarantor, who successfully obtained that judgment, then sought his attorney fees based
on the terms of the guaranty. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that its
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prior ruling declaring the guaranty unenforceable precluded the guarantor from relying on
the guaranty to recover attorney fees.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

Plaintiff/Appellant Michael Bilanzich filed this action in August 2000. His
complaint named numerous defendants including Defendants/Appellees JDL Holdings,
L.C. and John and Eunes Lonetti. JDL Holdings filed a separate action against Bilanzich
which was consolidated into the instant litigation. With respect to JDL and the Lonettis,
Bilanzich sought to rescind and have his guaranty declared unenforceable. He also
sought a claim for unjust enrichment. JDL's complaint sought to enforce the guaranty
against Bilanzich.
In August 2003, Bilanzich filed a motion for partial summary judgment against
JDL and the Lonettis. The trial court granted the motion and entered partial judgment
against JDL and the Lonettis declaring the guaranty unenforceable. Subsequently,
Bilanzich, JDL, and the Lonettis stipulated to a dismissal of the remainder of Bilanzich's
claims against them. On February 23, 2004, Bilanzich filed a motion for an award of
attorney fees. On June 23, 2004, the trial court denied the motion. Bilanzich appeals.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In December 1996, Defendants/Appellees JDL Holdings, L.C. and John and Eunes
Lonetti (hereafter collectively, "Lonetti") loaned Reese's Enterprises, Inc. ("REP)
approximately $1,780,600.00 which loan was evidenced by a promissory note and
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secured by a security agreement and trust deed. (R. 1822,1 2441.) In April 1998, Lonetti
and REI entered into an agreement modifying the promissory note ("Modification") to
increase the principal balance due to Lonetti from REI to $2,167,717.00. (R. 2441; see
also Add. A.)2 The only parties to the Note were John Lonetti, Eunes Lonetti, and REI.
(R. 2443; see also Add. A.)
In his statement of facts, Bilanzich asserts that the Modification contains a
reciprocal attorney fees provision that, according to Bilanzich, states: "If any action is
instituted with respect to this Agreement or supporting documents, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs to be paid by the other parties."
(Br. at 6) (Emphasis added.) This is not accurate. The attorney fees provision in the
Modification provides: "If any action is instituted with respect to this Agreement or
supporting documents, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of attorney's fees
and costs to be paid by the other party" (R. 2442; see also Add. A P ) (Emphasis
added.) The Modification contains a choice of law provision subjecting it to
interpretation and construction under Nevada law. (R. 2442; see also Add. A f4.)

In reviewing the record, it appears that there are at least two pages in volume 7 of the
record with the page number 1822. Page number 1822 cited herein is to an affidavit of
John Lonetti submitted in a bankruptcy court action in Nevada, which is attached to an
exhibit in Bilanzich's request for judicial notice.
2

A copy of the Modification is attached as Addendum A.
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Subsequent to the Modification, litigation was initiated between Lonetti and REI
which culminated in a settlement agreement. (R. 2084.3) The settlement agreement was
memorialized in a document dated September 1999 and referred to as the "Term Sheet."
(R.2084, 1776.)4
On September 30, 1999, Bilanzich executed a guaranty ("Guaranty")5 in favor of
Lonetti, guaranteeing to pay REI's obligations to Lonetti. (R. 528, 2445; see also Add.
C.) The Guaranty contains a sentence which states, "[t]his Guaranty includes all
principal, interest, costs, expenses, and attorney fees incurred in collection of the Note
and realization of the security." (R. 528; see also Add. C.)
In August 2000, Bilanzich initiated this litigation, seeking, with respect to Lonetti,
that the Guaranty be rescinded and declared unenforceable and asserting a claim for
unjust enrichment. (R. 1, 10-13, 1325-29.) JDL initiated a separate action against
Bilanzich seeking to enforce the Guaranty. (R. 2499-2501.) That action was
consolidated into the instant litigation. (R. 671-72.)
Bilanzich brought a motion for partial summary judgment against Lonetti asserting
that conditions precedent to the enforcement of the Guaranty, as contained in the Term
Sheet, did not occur, and therefore the Guaranty was not enforceable. (R. 1735-1736.) In
that motion, Bilanzich asserted, as undisputed fact, that "[t]he Term sheet and Bilanzich
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In reviewing the record, it appears that there are at least two pages in volume 8 of the
record with the page number 2084. Page number 2084 cited herein is to Lonetti's
Memorandum in Opposition to Bilanzich's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
4

A copy of the Term Sheet is attached as Addendum B.

5

A copy of the Guaranty is attached as Addendum C.
5

Guaranty are the only written agreements between the Lonettis and Bilanzich." (R.
1731.) Nowhere in the Term Sheet is there mention of an award of attorney fees to the
prevailing party in litigation concerning the same. (R. 1776-1777; see also Add. B.) The
trial court granted Bilanzich's motion. (R. 2221-2223.)
Thereafter, Bilanzich, through his attorney, approached Lonetti's attorneys about
settlement. (R. 2456; see also Add. D. Aff. Wade *[|5.) Bilanzich had sent a letter
outlining his proposed settlement terms to Lonetti. (R. 2456, 2460-61.) However,
numerous settlement discussions concerning the remaining claims occurred following the
time Bilanzich sent this letter. (R. 2447, 2455-2457.)6
Pursuant to these settlement discussions, Bilanzich offered to dismiss all
remaining claims against Lonetti in exchange for Lonetti waiving his right to appeal the
trial court's entry of partial summary judgment. (R. 2456-2461.) During the settlement
negotiations, it was communicated to Lonetti's attorneys that acceptance of the settlement
offer would bring the litigation between Bilanzich and Lonetti to a conclusion and that
Lonetti would have no further liability relative to claims by Bilanzich. (R. 2456-2457.)
Pursuant to these representations, and out of a desire to see the litigation come to
an end, Lonetti agreed to the settlement. (R. 2457.) In connection with the settlement,
Bilanzich prepared a joint motion and stipulation for dismissal and an order of dismissal,
which were forwarded to Lonetti's attorneys. (R. 2409, 2421.) After obtaining approval
of the settlement, Bilanzich, without providing any notice to Lonetti, filed a motion for
award of attorney fees and costs seeking fees and non-taxable costs in the amount of
6

Affidavits setting forth these discussions are attached at Addendum D.
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$89,161.92. (R. 2385-86, 2410, 2456-57.) In the motion Bilanzich claimed he was the
prevailing party in the litigation and was entitled to attorney fees and costs under the
terms of the Guaranty and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5. (R. 2391-92.)
Lonetti opposed the motion on the grounds that (1) there was no contractual or
statutory authority or basis for Bilanzich to obtain an attorney fees award against Lonetti
and (2) Bilanzich's motion for fees was contrary to and a violation of his settlement
agreement with Lonetti. (R. 2427-2438.)
On May 4, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. (R. 2248.) At that
hearing, the trial court, sua sponte, asked the parties to address an issue neither had
considered in their memoranda, which the trial court believed was threshold to the
motion. (R. 2248 Tr. 6:20-22.) The trial court stated, "[t]he law of the case and the
Court's [partial summary judgment] ruling on this matter already is that [Bilanzich] has
no liability under that guarantee, and if he has no liability under that guarantee how can
he come back and get attorneys fees under something that is basically a nullity as to his
legal rights and responsibilities. That's what worries me." (R. 2248 Tr. 3:21-25, 4:1.)
The court continued, " I . . . need some authority to back up what is basically a
legal consequence of the law of the case, and no one seems to have addressed it[.]" (Id
at Tr. 6:20-22.) The trial court instructed both parties to submit supplemental
memoranda addressing the issue. (See id. at Tr. 7:2-4.) The parties provided
supplemental briefing to address the issue. (R. 2520-2536.) On June 23, 2004, the trial
court, in a signed minute entry, denied Bilanzich's motion for attorney fees. (R. 2560.)
Bilanzich appeals.
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court correctly denied Bilanzich's motion for an award of attorney fees.
Its previous ruling granting partial summary judgment for Bilanzich nullified the
Guaranty and thus precluded Bilanzich from thereafter relying on the Guaranty to claim
an award of attorney fees against Lonetti. In making this determination the trial court
faithfully followed established precedent of our appellate courts and reached the decision
mandated by such precedent—that one cannot avoid a contractual obligation by having it
declared unenforceable and then rely on that very contract to claim an attorney fees
award.
There are at least two alternative grounds for affirmance. First, the Guaranty at
issue does not provide for an attorney fees award. In Utah, attorney fees are awardable
only if authorized by statute or contract." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ^[17, 40
P.3d 1119 (citation omitted). When authorized by contract, attorney fees "are awardable
only in accordance with the explicit terms of the contract and only to the extent permitted
by the contract." Wardlev Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(citation and quotation omitted). The Guaranty makes passing reference to attorney fees
but does not specifically provide for an attorney fees award in litigation concerning the
Guaranty itself. Under Utah law, this is fatal to a claim for attorney fees arising out of a
contract.
Additionally, under the plain language of the reciprocal attorney fees statute, at
least one party to an agreement must be entitled to attorney fees before the other party
8

can claim a reciprocal right to attorney fees. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2002).
Because the Guaranty contains no provision for an award to Lonetti in litigation
concerning the Guaranty, Bilanzich cannot claim a reciprocal right to recover attorney
fees under section 78-27-56.5. This is so, regardless of whether or not Lonetti may have
sought recovery of his own attorney fees incurred to enforce the Guaranty against
Bilanzich. See Fericks v. Soffe, 2004 UT 85, |25, 100 P.3d 1200.
Second, Bilanzich's motion for attorney fees is contrary to his settlement
agreement with Lonetti. Bilanzich agreed to dismiss his remaining claims against Lonetti
if Lonetti agreed to forego an appeal of the trial court's entry of partial summary
judgment. In essence, both parties agreed to lay down their weapons and go their
separate ways. However, once Lonetti dropped his weapon, Bilanzich continued the
battle he agreed to walk away from by filing his motion seeking $89,000-plus in attorney
fees and costs. Bilanzich's decision to continue the litigation by seeking attorney fees
from Lonetti is a breach of that agreement. Under Utah law, this Court may summarily
enforce that agreement by affirming the trial court's order denying Bilanzich's motion.
In this regard, settlement agreements are governed by the basic rules of contract
law. Therefore, at a minimum, this issue requires remand to the trial court to determine
whether there was in fact a meeting of the minds sufficient to constitute an agreement to
settle the case. Thus, even if this Court determines that Bilanzich is entitled to attorney
fees under the Guaranty or reciprocal fees statute, it cannot remand to the trial court with
instructions to award such fees without first requiring the trial court to address the
settlement issue.
9

ARGUMENT
L

BILANZICH HAS NO LEGAL BASIS TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES
UNDER THE GUARANTY OR THE RECIPROCAL FEES STATUTE.
A.

The Guaranty Does Not Provide For An Attorney Fees Award.

Bilanzich first argues that the Guaranty contains an attorney fees provision. This
argument is meritless. "In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute
or contract." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ^jl7, 40 P.3d 1119 (citation
omitted). When authorized by contract, attorney fees "'are awardable only in accordance
with the explicit terms of the contract and only to the extent permitted by the contract.'"
Wardlev Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Maynard v.
Wharton, 912 P.2d 446, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)).
The only provision in the Guaranty that references attorney fees is the last
sentence in the second paragraph which states: "This Guaranty includes all principal,
interest, costs, expenses, and attorney fees incurred in collection of the Note and
realization of the security." The Note is a reference to the promissory note and
Modification between Reese's Enterprises, Inc. and Lonetti. The security referenced in
the Guaranty, is not the Guaranty itself, it is the trust deed referenced in the Note and
Modification. Bilanzich is not a party to the Note, the Modification, or the trust deed
referenced therein.
There is no ambiguity with regard to the subject provision of the Guaranty.
Bilanzich has simply guaranteed payment of principal, interest, cost, expenses, and
attorney fees incurred in any collection of the Note and realization of the security
10

thereunder. What the Guaranty does not provide and cannot be construed to mean,
however, is that the prevailing party in litigation to enforce the Guaranty is entitled to an
award of attorney fees.
Cases wherein recovery of attorney fees has been founded upon contractual
language have routinely and without fail involved contracts which contain unambiguous
and clear reference to recovery of fees by the prevailing party as a result of some
triggering mechanism contained within the terms of the contract at issue. See Kraatz v.
Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 201, Tf23, 71 P.3d 201, cert, denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah
2003) (providing "defaulting party shall pay all expenses and costs incurred by the other
party in enforcing the terms hereof); Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 404, Tfl 1, 38 P.3d
1001 (providing for attorney fees in "litigation . . . to enforce" the contract); Keith
Jorgensen's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App 128, 1ffl25-26, 26 P.3d 872
(providing for award of attorney fees if one party "institutes any action or proceeding
against the other relating to the provisions of this Lease or any default hereunder");
Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(providing "the prevailing party to such resulting action shall have a right to recover from
the non-prevailing party any and all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys'
fees"); Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (providing
that party failing to perform agreement "agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing this
agreement, or of any right arising out of the breach thereof, including a reasonable
attorney's fee") (emphasis original)).
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Rather than relying on the terms of the Guaranty or Utah law governing attorney
fee awards, Bilanzich relies on two non-Utah cases in support of his argument—neither
of which are on point or persuasive. He cites Ashland Oil Inc. v. Cardinal Fuels, Inc.,
872 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1989) {unpublished table decision)1 for the proposition that the
language in the Guaranty de facto establishes a right to an award of attorney fees by a
guarantor in his position. (Br. at 9-10.) However, the court in Ashland Oil does not
provide any analysis or discussion of the substantive law governing an award of attorney
fees under the agreement it was addressing—in fact, the court does not even quote from
or provide an excerpt of the agreement containing the fee provision at issue. See 1989
WL 28404 **2. This is hardly the type of analysis that would mandate or justify a
departure from clearly established Utah law.
The same must be said of the court's analysis in the other case relied upon by
Bilanzich, Connecticut National Bank v. Foley, 560 A.2d 475 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
(Br. at 10-11.) There, in reference to an attorney fees award to a guarantor, the court
stated that "[t]his claim requires little discussion[,]" id at 478, and it provides none.
Significantly, the case has never been cited in a published decision for the proposition
that Bilanzich advances here. Thus, while the contractual language in Foley may bear
some similarity to the Guaranty at issue here, without more, it is not enough to displace
the rules governing recovery of attorney fees under a contract pursuant to Utah law.
Finally, Bilanzich baldly asserts that Lonetti's prayer for recovery of attorney fees
from Bilanzich constitutes some type of admission that the Guaranty provides for an
For the Court's convenience, a copy of Ashland Oil is attached as Addendum E.
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award of attorney fees. (Br. at 10.) This is also a meritless assertion. Attorney fees are
not recoverable merely because one party has prayed for the same in their complaint. See
Fericks v. Soffe, 2004 UT 85, ^j25, 100 P.3d 1200. Allegations or relief sought in a
complaint do not replace language in a contract. See id. Moreover, the complaint against
Bilanzich, while generally seeking recovery of attorney fees, does not specifically allege
that such fees are recoverable under the terms of the Guaranty. (R. 2499-2501.) Thus,
this Court must reject Bilanzich's meritless attempt to create a fees provision out of
whole cloth by supplanting language in a contract with a general prayer for relief in a
complaint.
In sum, the Guaranty does not contain an attorney fees provision that would entitle
Bilanzich to an award of attorney fees incurred in litigation involving the Guaranty.
Therefore, this Court can summarily affirm the trial court on this basis alone.
B.

Without An Underlying Contract Providing For An Attorney Fees
Award, Bilanzich Has No Claim For Recovery Of Fees Under The
Reciprocal Attorney Fees Statute.

Bilanzich next argues that Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 entitles him to an award
of attorney fees, (Br. at 11.) The plain language and threshold requirement of reciprocal
recovery of attorney fees under section 78-27-56.5 is that at least one party to the
agreement be entitled to attorney fees in litigation concerning the agreement. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2002) (reciprocal right to fees exists only where "at least one
party" has right to recover fees). Section 78-27-56.5 does not provide and cannot be
stretched to mean that the simple mention of the term "attorney fees" in an agreement

13

gives any party the right to an award of attorney fees if it is a prevailing party in litigation
involving that agreement.
Because the Guaranty does not provide for an award of attorney fees to Lonetti
against Bilanzich in litigation concerning the Guaranty, the reciprocal attorney fees
statute provides no basis for such an award to Bilanzich. Therefore, Bilanzich is not
entitled to his attorney fees under section 78-27-56.5.
To be sure, Bilanzich asserts in his issue statement and implies in the substance of
his brief that the Modification provides some basis for an award of attorney fees to
Bilanzich under section 78-27-56.5. (Br. at 1, 10.) This argument, whether express or
implied, is without merit for two reasons.
First, as set forth in detail above, it is undisputed that Bilanzich is not a party to
the Note or the Modification. In Anglin v, Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc., 2001
UT App 341, 37 P.3d 267, this Court addressed this same situation and held that the
reciprocal right to recover attorney fees on a promissory note or other writing under
section 78-27-56.5 is limited and restricted "to include only the parties to the original
promissory note, not any party to the litigation." IcL at ^10. Because Bilanzich is not a
party to the Note or the Modification, he has no right to recover attorney fees under
section 78-27-56.5.
Second, the Modification is not subject to section 78-27-56.5. Rather, it is subject
to Nevada law (see Add. A *|4) which does not have a reciprocal attorney fees statute.
See Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010 (governing award of attorney's fees); see also Pandelis
Construction Co., Inc. v. Jones-Viking Assocs., 734 P.2d 1236, 1238 n.3 (Nev. 1987)
14

(holding that an attorney fees provision which by its terms applies only to one party to an
agreement must be enforced as written no matter how unfair that result). Moreover, as in
Utah, see Wardley, 962 P.2d at 92, in Nevada, a court can only award attorney fees to
actual parties to the agreement containing an attorney fees provision—not any party to
the litigation concerning the agreement. See Wyatt v. Bowers, 747 P.2d 881, 884 (Nev.
1987).
Thus, to the extent Bilanzich claims his fees based on the Modification or Note in
connection with Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5, his claims must be rejected.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT ITS PRIOR
RULING DECLARING THE GUARANTY A NULLITY DEPRIVES
BILANZICH OF ANY CLAIM TO ATTORNEY FEES.
Even if this Court determines that the Guaranty does contain an attorney fees

provision, the trial court correctly concluded that its prior ruling declaring the Guaranty a
nullity deprives Bilanzich of any claim to an award of attorney fees under the Guaranty.
Under Utah law, a party that successfully avoids or nullifies a contract cannot, at
the same time, claim the benefit of an attorney fees provision in the contract. The
seminal and controlling case on this issue is BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456
(Utah 1978). In BLT, the plaintiff sought specific performance of a written contract with
the defendant. See id. at 456. In defense, the defendant sought to rescind the contract.
See id. The trial court, finding a failure of condition precedent to the effectiveness of the
contract, ordered rescission of the same and also awarded the defendant his attorney fees
pursuant to a provision in the contract providing for such fees. See id. at 457-58.
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The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rescission of the contract but
reversed the award of attorney fees. See id. at 456. In reversing the attorney fees award,
the supreme court adopted the rule that a party "may not avoid the contract and, at the
same time, claim the benefits of the provision for attorney fees." Id. at 458 (citation
omitted). This rule applies here.
Bilanzich avoided the Guaranty by having it nullified and declared unenforceable.
That ruling, as observed by the trial court at the May 4 hearing, constitutes the law of the
case. (R. 2248 Tr. 6:20-22.) See also Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034,
1037 (Utah 1995) (stating "a decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is
binding in successive stages of the same litigation"). Under BLT and the law of the case
doctrine, Bilanzich cannot claim the benefit of an attorney fees provision under a
Guaranty he previously avoided by having the trial court declare the same unenforceable.
Although BLT was decided prior to the enactment of Utah's reciprocal attorney
o

fees statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5, subsequent case law makes clear that BLT
has survived the enactment of 78-27-56.5, and is the current state of law in Utah on this
issue. See, e.g.. Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 404, Tfl4, 38 P.3d 1001 (stating "because
the party had successfully rescinded the contract, the contract no longer existed, and
therefore they could no longer rely upon any of its terms." (quoting BLT, 586 P.2d at
458)).

Section 78-27-56.5 is applicable to cases involving contracts executed after April 29,
1986. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2002). BLT was decided in 1978.
16

In Chase v. Scott, the party seeking fees under the contract at issue mounted a
successful defense to an action for rescission of that contract. See id. at ^[14. This Court
determined that the party mounting the successful defense to rescission is entitled to an
award of attorney fees under the contract because the contract remains in force and effect.
See id. at ^[16-17. The court then expressly determined that this holding was consistent
with both BLT and section 78-27-56.5.
This Court recognized that "[t]he [supreme] court reasoned [in BLT] because the
party [seeking fees] had successfully rescinded the contract, the contract no longer
existed, and therefore they could no longer rely upon any of its terms." IdL at ^[14. It then
stated that "our [holding] would be consistent with BLT limiting awards under this type
of contractual provision to only those parties who successfully defend against rescission
and thus enforce the contract." Id fl6. The court of appeals determined that its holding
was consistent with the reciprocal attorney fees statute because either party would be
entitled to attorney fees if they successfully defended against rescission. See id.
Thus, according to Chase, had either party in the instant case successfully defeated
an attempt by the other party to have the Guaranty declared unenforceable, he would
have been entitled to fees under the Guaranty because the Guaranty would have survived
and remained in place.9 However, where, as here, the Guaranty is declared unenforceable
and is a nullity, BLT and Chase foreclose any right Bilanzich may have had to obtain his
attorney fees based on the Guaranty.
9

Of course, as set forth above in Point I, we maintain that under Utah law, the Guaranty
contains no provision awarding attorney fees to any party in litigation concerning the
Guaranty. We only assume it does here for purposes of analysis under Point II.
17

In sum? the trial court declared the Guaranty unenforceable. This was a result of
Bilanzich's own motion that allowed him to avoid his obligations under the Guaranty.
Because the Guaranty has been avoided and is of no force or effect, Bilanzich cannot rely
upon its terms to obtain an award of attorney fees. The trial court correctly denied
Bilanzich's motion for fees on this basis. This Court must affirm.

III.

BILANZICH'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES IS CONTRARY TO HIS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH LONETTI.
Bilanzich's motion for attorney fees is contrary to his settlement agreement with

Lonetti. This agreement was reached after extensive discussions between counsel for the
parties in which Bilanzich agreed to dismiss his remaining claims against Lonetti if
Lonetti agreed to forego an appeal of the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment.
As set forth in undisputed affidavits submitted by counsel for Lonetti {see Add. D), it was
understood by Lonetti that this settlement meant that the litigation between Bilanzich and
Lonetti would come to a conclusion and that Lonetti would have no further liability to
Bilanzich. Yet, obviously, the litigation has not ended. Bilanzich chose to continue the
litigation and further expose Lonetti to liability—contrary to the assurances and
representations made to Lonetti's counsel in the course of negotiations. (R. 2457; see
also Add. B. Wade Aff. 16(b).)
In response to these affidavits and arguments raised below, Bilanzich simply
asserted that attorney fees were not discussed and were not part of the settlement
discussions. (R. 2492-2493.) However, Bilanzich did not submit a single affidavit
disputing the facts set out in the Lonetti affidavits. (R. 2487-2506.) Rather, Bilanzich
18

treats this as a small matter and takes comfort in the fact that there was no written
agreement to waive attorney fees and costs. (Br. at 4.) This is no small matter.
In Utah, "[i]t is a basic rule that the law favors the settlement of disputes."
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Sys.. Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(citation omitted). In this regard, courts have inherent authority to summarily enforce
settlement agreements. See id. Moreover, contrary to Bilanzich's assertions, it is of no
legal consequence that the parties have not signed a settlement agreement or that the
settlement agreement is not reduced to writing. See id. at 584-85. Rather, "[settlement
agreements are governed by the rules applied to general contract actions." Sackler v.
Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). "Under the principles of basic contract law, a
contract is not formed unless there is a meeting of the minds." Id
Here, it is undisputed that Lonetti's understanding of the settlement was that if he
waived an appeal of the trial court's partial summary judgment, he would be allowed to
walk away from the litigation unscathed, having no further liability to Bilanzich. While
the issue of attorney fees may not have been specifically addressed in conversations or
correspondence between the parties, it is of little consequence. The end of litigation
means the end of litigation—no matter how Bilanzich chooses to justify his actions, his
motion for almost $90,000 in fees and costs directly contradicts his representations and
assurances which constitute the basis for the settlement agreement.
It is well settled that this Court can affirm the trial court on any alternate ground or
theory that is supported in the record. See Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ^|18, 29 P.3d
1225. Bilanzich's failure to dispute the affidavits submitted by Lonetti with affidavits of
19

his own is telling. This is particularly true where significant discussions took place after
Bilanzich sent his settlement letter. (R. 2456; see also Add. D. Wade Aff. 1fl[5-6.) The
affidavits clearly establish a settlement in which the litigation between Lonetti and
Bilanzich would cease, Lonetti would forego his right to appeal, and face no further
exposure or liability from Bilanzich. Clearly, Bilanzich's continued litigation is in
violation of the terms of this agreement. Therefore, this Court would be justified in
summarily enforcing the terms of this agreement by affirming the trial court on such
grounds.
Alternatively, if this Court determines that Bilanzich is somehow entitled to
attorney fees, it must remand to the trial court with instructions to address the settlement
agreement issue prior to awarding such fees to Bilanzich. See Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d
888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating "where material facts concerning the existence or terms
of an agreement to settle are in dispute, the parties must be allowed an evidentiary
hearing"). Here, at minimum, there is a dispute as to the terms of the settlement
agreement, and a genuine question as to whether there was a meeting of the minds as it
related to integral terms of that agreement, namely, the question of attorney fees.
Such a remand would be consistent with the trial court's own expectations and
assurances to Lonetti. At the May 4 hearing, the trial court stated that there would be no
reason to address the settlement agreement issue if the issue it wanted addressed {see
Point II supra) mooted any claim Bilanzich had to attorney fees. (R. 2248 Tr. 7:8-25,
8:1-9.) The trial court then assured Lonetti's counsel that the opportunity to address the
settlement issue would be available to him. (See id at Tr. 8:4-25, 9:1.) Specifically, the

20

trial court stated that, if after the supplemental briefing on the nullification issue "I find
[Bilanzich's] position is still well taken, at least as to that issue, then we'll give you a
chance to calendar it and talk about everything else." {Id. at Tr. 8:24-25, 9:1.)
In sum, this Court may affirm on the alternate basis that Bilanzich's motion for
attorney fees violated his settlement agreement with Lonetti. In the alternative, if this
Court finds Bilanzich is entitled to an award of attorney fees, it must remand with
instructions to the trial court to conduct a hearing to address the settlement agreement
issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court must affirm the trial court.
Respectfully submitted this n

--"day of April 2005.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

Terry/L. Wade
BryanJ. Pattison
Attorneys for JDL Holdings, L.C., and
John Lonetti and Eunes Lonetti
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

In accordance with Utah R. App. P. 26(b), I, Bryan J. Pattison, certify that on

V>

April W , 2005,1 served two (2) copies of the BRIEF OF APPELLEES upon counsel for
Appellant, via first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid, to the following address:
Richard D. Burbidge
Jefferson W. Gross
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

Bryan JL Pattison
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MODIFICATION OF NOTF.CT.rupT.Tl* y m r ^ 0 f ^
AND SECTTPTTV ^ r . p y ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^

WHEREAS, REESE'S ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nevada corporation (hereinafter
referred to as BORROWER) executed a Promissory Note in the amount of ONE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED and NO/100
DOLLARS ($1,780,600.00) dated December 31, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as NOTE)
in favor of JOHN and EUNES LONETTI, JR., (hereinafter collectively referred to as
LENDER) pursuant to the provisions of the Loan Agreement dated December 31,1996,
which NOTE is secured by a Deed of Trust and Security Agreement, and
WHEREAS, the Loan Agreement was amended on February 4, 1998, to reflect an
additional loan from LENDER to BORROWER in the amount of THREE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT and 00/100 DOLLARS

|TFTY

($354,938.00), and
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to modify certain provisions of the NOTE
U o u t modifying the legal effect or priority of the subject Deed of Trust or Security
Agreement to reflect the additional loan made on February 4, 1998.
NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the parties agree as

ill :ows:
L

Modification of Fromi^ory Note. The parties hereto agree that the NOTE

sjiall be modified as follows:
be $?1 V ^ f n ^ ^
^ ^ ° f ** N 0 T E M ° f *** 2> 1 9 ^ , shall
be 2.2,167,717.00, which amount represents the balance of the principal and
:40FFICE\WPWIN\CLIEKnLONETTMGRMWOT.MOD.AGR

1
March 27,1998

accrued interest of the NOTE and the additional loan made on February 4
1998.
b. Said adjusted balance together with interest thereon at the stated interest
rate within the NOTE, shall be payable in accordance with the terms of the
NOTE in monthly installments in the initial approximate amount vof
$20,918.94 commencing April 1, 1998.
2. No Modification of Deed of Trust or Security Agreement, The terms,
covenants and conditions contained in the NOTE, Loan Agreement, Deed of Trust and
Security Agreement, which are not modified by this Agreement shall remain operative
and in full force and effect. This Agreement shall serve merely as an amendment to the
NOTE and not an alteration of the subject Deed of Trust or Security Agreement, it being
agreed and understood that the subject security instruments shall continue to remain a
first obligation and encumbrance against property securing the NOTE.
3. Attorney's Fees. If any action is instituted with respect to this Agreement or
supporting documents, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of attorney's fees
and costs to be paid by the other party.
4. Law Governing. The laws of the State of Nevada shall govern the
construction and interpretation of this Agreement
5. Modification. This Agreement may not be modified or terminated orally, and
no modification or attempt of waiver shall be valid, unless in writing, signed by all parties
hereto.
6. Benefit. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the
respective parties hereto, their legal representatives, successors and assigns.

C:\OFRCE\WPWIN\CIiE>mLONErn^GIU^OT-MOD.AGR
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March 27,1998

7. Entire A greemenf. All understandings and agreements heretofore and
,etween the parties are merged in this Agreement which alone fully and completely
jxpresses their understanding and agreement
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreements the

P l _ day of

d^Jl

1998>

RENDER:

LONETTI, JR.

/

EUNES LONETTI

^ORROWER:
REESE'S ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Nevada corporation

""") ^ " ""

.-^

si
jy

GA'YL^-REESE/kresident

qfFICE\WPWIN\CLIE3TOLONETTMGRWWOT-MOD.AGR

DEANNA REESE; Secretary/
Treasurer

3

March 27,1998
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GUARANTY
For value received, I, Michael Bilanzich, (Guarantor). Zs^i
UJc^U*^ OfiSail LtxkjL. , $>ftcT C^b- County, Utah M/o9 . absolutely guarantee payment to John Lonetti Jr. and Eunes I Lonetti, of 2200 Red Oak, Las Vegas, Clark
County Nevada 89109, of a Promissory Note dated December 31,1996, in the original
principal amount of One Million Seven Hundred Eighty Thousand Six Hundred Dollars
($1,780,600.00), executed by Reese's Enterprises, Inc., a Nevada Corporation obligor,
and any amendments or modifications thereto. The Note has a current principal balance
of $2,000,000.00
Guarantor waives notice of acceptance of this Guaranty and waives diligence on
the part of obligee in collection of the indebtedness. Obligee shall have the privilege of
granting such renewals and extensions as obligee may deem proper, without notice to
Guarantor. Guarantor further expressly waives notice of nonpayment, protest, and notice of protest with respect to the indebtedness covered by this Guaranty. This Guaranty includes all principal, interest, costs, expenses, and attorney fees incurred in collection of the Note and realization of the security.
This Guaranty is in addition to such other security as obligee now or hereafter
may have. Obligee may surrender or release all or any portion of such other security
without affecting this Guaranty. It shall not be necessary for obligee to enforce payment
by Guarantor of the indebtedness, to first institute suit, or to pursue or exhaust remedies
against obligor, or against any other security that obligor may have.
Guarantor acknowledges that this Guaranty is in effect and binding on Guarantor
without reference to whether it is signed by any other person or persons. Guarantor
agrees that this Guaranty shall continue in full force and effect notwithstanding the
death of Guarantor, or the release by agreement or by operation of law of, or the extensionof time to, any other guarantor or guarantors as to obligations then existing.
Liability of Guarantor under this Guaranty shall not be affected or impaired by the
existence, from time to time, of an indebtedness or liability of principal obligor to obligee
in excess of the amount of this Guaranty.
DATED THIS j>±_ day of

Sep'fe^Up

GUARANTOR:

MICHAEL BILANZICH
tfARVRiehards, Oonion 10070.00\guartmty2 092999 10070.nft2

. 1999.
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Terry L. Wade (3882)
Bryan J. Pattison (8766)
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DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

192 East 200 North, Third Floor
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 674-0400
Facsimile: (435) 628-1610
Attorneys for JDL Holdings, L.C. and
John Lonetti and Eunes Lonetti
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL T. BELANZICH,
Plaintiff,
v.
AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY L. WADE
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
McDONOUGH, a professional corporation, D.
WILLIAMS RONNOW, an individual,
REESE'S ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nevada
corporation, JOHN LONETTI, an individual,
EUNES I. LONETTI, an individual JDL
HOLDINGS, L.L.C.. a Utah limited liability
company, CAMBRIDGE CAPITAL GROUP,
INC., a Delaware corporation, CAMBRIDGE
HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation,
ERIC CUMMINGS, an individual, JOHN C.
HOWE, an individual, FOOTBRIDGE
LIMITED TRUST, a Bermuda corporation,
OLD HILL PARTNERS, a partnership, and
DOES TV through X,
Defendants.

Consolidated Case No. 010500411
Judge James L. Shumate

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)
) ss.
)

TERRY

L. WADE, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says:

1.

I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this

Affidavit.
2.

I am an attorney with the law firm of Durham Jones & Pinegar representing

Defendants John Lonetti, Eunes I. Lonetti, and JDL Holdings, L.L.C. in this matter.
3.

This affidavit is given in support of Defendants John Lonetti, Eunes I. Lonetti, and

JDL Holdings, L.L.C, (hereinafter "Lonetti") Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs.
4.

On December 15, 2003, the Court entered an Order for Partial Summary Judgment in

this action, on Plaintiffs seventh cause of action for Declaratory Relief.
5.

As we were evaluating the merits of an appeal of the Court's Order for Partial

Summary Judgment, we were contacted by Plaintiffs counsel, Jeff Gross, concerning the possibility
of settling the case. His proposal was set forth in a letter dated January 15, 2004, which we
received on that same date. This letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
6.

After reviewing Mr. Gross' proposal for settlement, I spoke with him on Jan. 21,

2004, and again on Jan. 27. While I do not purport to recall exact words used, the following points
were discussed in these conversations:
a.

Mr. Gross indicated that his client wanted to bring the litigation to a

conclusion. He offered to dismiss the remaining cause of action against Lonetti on condition
that Lonetti would refrain from filing an appeal.
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b.

I stated to Mr. Gross that if we were to accept his proposal, and forgo the

appeal, we would want the matter to be finally and completely concluded. I expressed that if
Lonetti were to "walk", we would want to be sure that there would not be any remaining
exposure to liability relative to him. In this regard, we discussed various scenarios in which
further exposure might arise, and Mr. Gross repeatedly and consistently opined that he could
not see any realistic possibility that Lonetti could be pursued further by anyone.
c.

I am certain that the fact was made clear to Mr. Gross that we would not

waive the right of appeal, unless we were confident that Lonetti would not face further
claims of any nature.
d.

Despite having clearly conveyed our concerns to Mr. Gross about further

exposure to Lonetti, he never once made mention of his client's desire to recover attorney's
fees and costs from Lonetti. The opportunity arose in multiple conversations with me, as
well as another attorney in our office, Bryan Pattison.
7.

After conveying our client's acceptance of the proposal that both Mr. Gross' client

and ours "walk", Mr. Gross prepared the documentation and pleadings to effect the settlement. He
did not include in those pleadings or documents any reference to his client's claim for attorney's
fees or costs.
8.

I can say that Mr. Gross' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs is completely

out of line with our discussions about ending the litigation and eliminating the exposure of Lonetti.
DATED this

IQJ*— day of March, 2004.

^o

[jJ «ZSU^

IRRY L. WADE
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to (or affirmed) before me this _IV_ day of March, 2004 by
TERRY L. WADE.
~~

JAIME GARGANO
Notary Public
Stria of Utah
F
My Comrn.Eipfr*i May 29,2008
192 E 200 H 3rd Fl St George UT 84771]

)TARY PUBLIC
Address:
My Commission Expires:

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the
AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY L. WADE

Iff da^
day of March, 2004,1 served a copy of the foregoing

on the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-

paid, addressed as follows:
Richard D. Burbidge
Jefferson W. Gross

Rodney G. Snow
Edwin C. Barnes

BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON

215 South State Street, Suite 920
SLC,UT 84111

One Utah Center, 13th Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2216

Eric L. Cummings

Cambridge Capital Group, Inc.
18 East 34th Street
Savannah, Georgia 31401

CAMBRIDGE HOLDINGS GROUP, INC.
c/o CAMBRIDGE CAPITAL GROUP, INC.

PO Box One
Cabin John, Maryland 20818-0001
Eric L. Cummings
6700 Persimmon Tree Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20817-4320

V. Lowry Snow
J. Gregory Hardman
SNOW, JENSEN & REECE

134 North 200 East #302
St. George, Utah 84770

EXHIBIT A

BXJRBIDGB AKXI M l T C H E U L
A PARTNERSHIP Or PROFESSIONAL COWPORATION*
A T T O R N E Y S ! A M P C O U N S E L O R * AT LAW
J E F F f c R S O N W. 0 R O 5 S

PARKBIDE

TOWER

2|S S O U T H STATE STREET, SUITE © 2 0
SALT

LAJCR C I T Y , U T A H

ti4tui-iio3

TELEPHONE
(SOU 3 5 5 - 0 6 7 7
TACSJMIUE NUMDER
(BOD 3 S S - 2 3 4 I
Jwaro5e@burbldgoBindmltcholl.C6m

January 15, 2004

VIA FACSIMILE
Bryan J. Pattison
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
192 East 200 North, 3rd Floor
St. George, UT 84770
Re:

Bilanzich v, Jones Waldo, et al.

Dear Bryan:
You have asked me to memorialize how our client, Michael Bilanzich, is willing to
proceed following the Court's Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment. As we have
discussed, Mr. Bilanzich's remaining claim against the Lonettis and JDL Holdings, L.C., is
for rescission, i.e, the parties would be restored to the position they were in prior to the failed
transaction. If Mr. Bilanzich was to prevail on that claim at trial, one aspect of relief would be
your clients' return of the $300,000 which they receivedfromthe Cambridge
Defendants/Howe Defendants. Because the Cambridge Defendants/Howe Defendants have
expressed their desire to continue the litigation in hopes of recovering this $300,000 from Mr.
Bilanzich, we certainly have some motivation to continue pursuit of the claim.
With that said, Mr. Bilanzich will proceed on one of two alternative routes:
1.

If John Lonetti* Eunes Lonetti and JDL Holdings, L.C., waive their right to
appeal Judge Shumate's Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, Mr,
Bilanzich will dismiss his claim for rescission with prejudice; or

2.

Mr, Bilanzich will continue to pursue his claim for rescission against your
clients.

We realize that, with Mr, Brindley's departure, you may still be in the process of
getting up to speed on the matter. However, we need to have your answer within one week,
i.e., by January 22, 2004,

Bryan J, Pattison
January 15,2004
Page 2
If you have any questions, please call me.
Sincerely,
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

Jefferson W. Gross
JWG:dms
cc:
Stephen Marshall
Michael Bilanzich

2^MA3 10 PM '^20

Terry L. Wade (3882)
Bryan J. Pattison (8766)
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DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

192 East 200 North, Third Floor
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 674-0400
Facsimile: (435)628-1610
Attorneys for JDL Holdings, L.C. and
John Lonetti and Eunes Lonetti

BY.
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL T. BILANZICH,
Plaintiff,
v.
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN J. PATTISON
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
McDONOUGH, a professional corporation, D.
WILLIAMS RONNOW, an individual,
REESE'S ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nevada
corporation, JOHN LONETTI, an individual,
EUNES I. LONETTI, an individual JDL
HOLDINGS. L.L.C.. a Utah limited liability
company, CAMBRIDGE CAPITAL GROUP,
INC., a Delaware corporation, CAMBRIDGE
HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation,
ERIC CUMMINGS, an individual, JOHN C.
HOWE, an individual, FOOTBRIDGE
LIMITED TRUST, a Bermuda corporation,
OLD HILL PARTNERS, a partnership, and
DOES IV through X,
Defendants.
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STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
)

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
BRYAN

1.

J. PATTISON, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says:

I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this

Affidavit.
2.

I am an attorney with the law firm of Durham Jones & Pinegar representing

Defendants John Lonetti, Eunes I. Lonetti, and JDL Holdings, L.L.C. in this matter.
3.

During January and February of 2004,1 engaged in extensive discussions with

Jefferson Gross, attorney for Plaintiff Michael Bilanzich in the above-captioned matter.
4.

Our discussions concerned my clients seeking a Rule 54(b) certification and appeal

of the court's granting of Bilanzich's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or, in the alternative,
foregoing certification and appeal in exchange for Bilanzich dismissing his remaining claims
against my clients.
5.

The understanding with regard to the dismissal was that the litigation between my

clients and Bilanzich would end and my clients would have no further liability to Bilanzich.
DATED this

jl)

day of March, 2004.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to (or affirmed) before me this JJl

day of March, 2004 by

BRYAN J. PATTISON

<%4/QTJ~^
JTARY PUBLIC ( j
Address:
My Commission Expires:

*,
JAIME GARGANO
Notary PubBc
Stats of Utah
._
My Cofnm.Expfrw May 29,2005
1 182 E 200 N 3rd R 5 t George UT 64771
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN

/ ( / day of March, 2004,1 served a copy of the foregoing

J. PATTISON on the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage

pre-paid, addressed as follows:

Richard D. Burbidge
Jefferson W. Gross
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

215 South State Street, Suite 920
SLC,UT 84111
Rodney G. Snow
Edwin C. Barnes
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON

One Utah Center, 13th Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2216
Eric L. Cummings
CAMBRIDGE HOLDINGS GROUP, INC.
c/o CAMBRIDGE CAPITAL GROUP, INC.

PO Box One
Cabin John, Maryland 20818-0001
Cambridge Capital Group, Inc.
18 East 34th Street
Savannah, Georgia 31401
Eric L. Cummings
6700 Persimmon Tree Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20817-4320
V. Lowry Snow
SNOW, JENSEN & REECE

134 North 200 East #302
St. George, Utah 84770
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NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
(The Court's decision is referenced in a "Table of
Decisions Without Reported Opinions" appearing in
the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA4 Rule 36 for rules
regarding the citation of unpublished opinions.)

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
ASHLAND OIL, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CARDINAL FUELS, INC., Home Oil Company,
Inc., Southside Oil Company, Inc.,
Tucker W. McLaughlin, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 88-3886.
Argued Feb. 10, 1989.
Decided March 28, 1989.
W.D.Va.
AFFIRMED.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C.
Turk, Chief District Judge. (CA-81 -1028).
Mary Stewart Murphy (Wyatt B. Durrette, Jr.,
McCarthy & Durrette, P.C. on brief) for appellants.
Frank Kenneth Friedman (Michael A. Geary,
Woods, Rogers & Hazelgrove on brief) for appellee.
Before K.K. HALL, SPROUSE, and WILKINS,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
**1 Cardinal Fuels, Inc., Home Oil Company, Inc.,
Southside Oil Company, Inc. (the Oil Companies),
and Tucker W. McLaughlin (collectively, the
Defendants) appeal from the grant of summary
judgment in favor of Ashland Oil, Inc. on their
counterclaim for abuse of process. McLaughlin also
appeals from an award of attorneys' fees to Ashland.
We affirm.
I.
In 1983 McLaughlin, acting in his official capacity
as president of the Oil Companies, signed a
© 2005 Thomson/West. No

promissory note to Ashland. He also executed a
personal guaranty agreement guaranteeing payment
of the note and any attorneys' fees and costs incurred
in its collection. The Oil Companies were identified
in the note as Virginia corporations with addresses in
Richlands, Covington, and Halifax, Virginia. The
Halifax address, which was also listed in the guaranty
agreement for McLaughlin, was the address used by
Ashland in mailing statements for the note.
When the Oil Companies defaulted on the note in
1985, Ashland filed suit against the Defendants for
payment under the note and the guaranty agreement.
It also sought attorneys' fees from McLaughlin under
the guaranty agreement. Ashland first attempted
service of the summons and complaint by certified
mail at what it allegedly believed to be McLaughlin's
personal address: 1740 Fifth Street, Isle of Palms,
South Carolina. The correct address was, in fact, 17
Forty-fifth Street. When the papers were returned
unclaimed, service was again attempted by regular
mail to the same address, also unsuccessfully. Service
was finally made on the Secretary of the
Commonwealth of Virginia pursuant to Va.Code
Aim. S 8.01-329 (1950 & 1984 Repl.Vol).
Defendants failed to timely appear and default
judgments were entered against them, jointly and
severally, for more than $200,000.00 in principal and
interest due under the note and against McLaughlin
for attorneys' fees of $35,000.00. When McLaughlin
subsequently learned of the default judgments,
Defendants moved to set them aside pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c) and 60(b).
For good cause shown, the district court set aside the
default judgments. Defendants then filed an answer
and a counterclaim for abuse of process arising from
the attempted service of the summons and complaint
at the South Carolina address. The district court
granted summary judgment to Ashland on both its
complaint and the counterclaim, and also awarded it
attorneys' fees of $12,500.00.
II.
In Virginia, a claim for abuse of process lies for "the
perversion of regularly-issued process to accomplish
some ulterior purpose for which the procedure was
not intended." Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Mount
Vernon Assoc, 235 Va. 53 L 539. 369 S.E.2d 857,
862 (1988). The essential elements of the claim are
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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"the existence of an ulterior purpose" and "an act in
the use of the process not proper in the regular
prosecution of the proceedings." Id.
Defendants' abuse of process counterclaim rested on
the use by Ashland of the incorrect personal address
of McLaughlin to attempt service of process rather
than the Virginia business address to which it had
previously sent the statements. The district court
properly granted summary judgment to Ashland
because the essence of Defendants' claim was the
allegedly improper manner in which Ashland issued
the process. "The gravaman of the tort [of abuse of
process] lies in the abuse or the perversion of the
process after it has been issued," id, not in the
issuance of the process.
III.
**2 The guaranty agreement provided that
McLaughlin would pay Ashland its "reasonable"
attorneys' fees incurred in collection of the note in the
event of default. At the time of the hearing on the
motion for summary judgment, attorneys for Ashland
claimed a total of between $4000.00 and $5000.00 in
fees, to date, for their efforts to collect on the note.
Although collection had not been completed, the
district court awarded Ashland a lump sum fee of
$12,500.00. McLaughlin contends that the award
was unreasonable and unsupported by sufficient
evidence as to value of the services rendered.
Determination of reasonableness is governed by
South Carolina law since the guaranty agreement was
executed by McLaughlin in South Carolina. See Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64 H938):
Occidental Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bankers &
Shippers Ins. Co., 564 F.Supp. 1501. 1503
(W.D.Va.l983\ Under the law of South Carolina,
the district court award of attorneys' fees equalling
approximately six percent of the total debt to be
collected is reasonable on its face even in the absence
of evidence regarding the value of the services
rendered.
See Farmers & Merchants Bank v.
Farqnoll 21A S.C. 23. 25-26, 260 S.E.2d 185. 187
(1979).
AFFIRMED.
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